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Memory Processes in Elderly 
Eyewitnesses: What We Know 
and What We Don’t Know
Brian H. Bornstein, Ph. D. 
Research is reviewed on the memory abilities of elderly eyewitnesses. 
Two major issues are addressed: First, how credible are elderly witness-
es? Second, how accurate are they? Despite negative stereotypes regard-
ing elderly eyewitnesses, they do not necessarily lack credibility at trial. 
In terms of their memory performance, older witnesses are as accurate 
as young adults in many respects, but they are particularly vulnerable to 
misleading information that is presented after the witnessed event. Fur-
thermore, their performance varies depending on the type of information 
that is sought and the manner in which their memory is assessed. Rec-
ommendations are made for improving the reliability of testimony that 
is offered by elderly eyewitnesses. 
In recent years there has been growing interest in the eyewitness memory of children, 
which has resulted in the publication of numerous articles and several books on the sub-
ject (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1989; Ceci, Toglia, & Ross, 1987; Dent & Flin, 1992; Good-
man & Bottoms, 1993; Perry & Wrightsman, 1991). Relatively scant attention has been 
paid, however, to issues concerning the memory capabilities of elderly eyewitnesses. This 
disparity is probably due, at least in part, to the important role of children’s testimony in 
cases involving physical or sexual abuse (e.g., Goodman, Aman, & Hirschman, 1987); 
yet elderly adults may also frequently be crime victims. Crimes against the elderly are in-
creasing, as the crime rate in general increases and the elderly segment of the population 
becomes larger (Cunningham, 1976; Hoyer, 1979). In addition, the fact that older individ-
uals are staying active longer increases the probability that they will be bystander witness-
es to various crimes. Reliable statistics do not exist on whether children or elderly adults 
are, overall, relatively more likely to be crime victims. However, children are probably 
more likely to be victims of some crimes, such as sexual abuse, while the elderly are espe-
cially likely to be victims of certain other types of crimes, such as fraud, personal larceny, 
and burglary (Cunningham, 1976; Dussich & Eichman, 1976; Hoyer, 1979). 
I am grateful to A. C. Emler and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on the manuscript. 
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It has been well established that certain cognitive functions, including memory, 
tend to decline in normal aging (Craik & Trehub, 1982; Salthouse, 1991). 1 Thus, just 
as it is necessary to understand the impact of children’s general memory processes on 
their testimonial competence, it is important to know what effect, if any, the aging pro-
cess might have on the testimony offered by elderly witnesses. The present paper ad-
dresses this issue by focusing on two questions: First, how credible are elderly wit-
nesses? The impact of any eyewitness’s testimony is infl uenced greatly by jurors’ per-
ceptions of his or her reliability. Jurors’ stereotypes about children’s cognitive limita-
tions lead them to evaluate child witnesses, especially very young ones, as less cred-
ible than adults (Goodman, Golding, Helgeson, Haith, & Michelli, 1987; Yarmey & 
Jones, 1983). To the extent that jurors are aware of some of the cognitive defi cits asso-
ciated with old age, elderly witnesses’ reports might likewise be weighed less heavily 
than those of young adults. 
Second, how accurate is older subjects’ eyewitness memory? Jurors’ ability to es-
timate the accuracy of adult eyewitnesses is poor (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981); 
hence, elderly witnesses might be perceived as unreliable, while their actual memory 
performance in eyewitness situations is in fact quite good. Elderly subjects’ accuracy can 
be investigated directly, by comparing older and younger adults’ performance in eyewit-
ness situations, and indirectly, by examining the effect of age on performance in tasks 
that are highly relevant to eyewitness memory such as face recognition. Finally, one can 
evaluate accuracy by considering whether factors having a negative effect on eyewit-
ness memory in general, such as misleading suggestions, might have an especially pro-
nounced infl uence on elderly subjects. After reviewing research on age effects on eye-
witness accuracy, the paper concludes with recommendations for improving the memory 
performance of elderly witnesses. 
CREDIBILITY
Ross, Dunning, Toglia, and Ceci (1990, Experiments 1 and 2) addressed mock jurors’ per-
ceptions of an eyewitness as a function of the witness’s age. Subjects were shown a video-
tape of a simulated drug trial, in which the prosecution’s key witness was portrayed by an 
8-, 21-, or 74-year-old male. Subsequently, they rated the key witness’s credibility along a 
number of dimensions and judged the degree of the defendant’s guilt/innocence. The wit-
ness’s age had no effect on subjects’ estimates of the defendant’s guilt; yet, contrary to ex-
pectation, both the child and the elderly eyewitness were perceived as more credible over-
all than the young adult witness. Specifi cally, the elderly witness was viewed as more ac-
curate, more likely to be telling the truth, more intelligent, and more trustworthy, com-
pared to the young adult witness. 
This result is particularly surprising in light of Ross et al. ’s (1990, Experiment 3) 
fi nding that subjects held a negative stereotype about elderly adults’ eyewitness capabili-
1 The defi nition of “normal” aging is highly variable. Most commonly, it is operationalized as the 
study of adults who are in good health (i.e., non-pathological) and over age 60, though the age range 
varies (Salthouse, 1991). Cognitive defi cits mayor may not be associated with physical (i.e., neuro-
logical) health problems. Salthouse (1991) points out that such cognitive defi cits may be associated 
with aging without being inevitably caused by it. 
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ties in general. Subjects (who were college undergraduates) viewed the average 74-year-
old as having a less accurate memory than the average 21-year-old, as well as being more 
susceptible to misleading questions. Furthermore, although the elderly witness was per-
ceived as somewhat more honest, they said that they would give an elderly witness’s tes-
timony less weight, and one-third of the subjects believed that at a certain age, people be-
come too old to be trusted as witnesses (the average estimated “age of incompetency” was 
75. 3 years). Interestingly, elderly subjects themselves are even more likely than college 
students—as well as than lawyers, judges, and other randomly selected potential jurors—
to hold a negative stereotype about elderly witnesses’ ability to give accurate testimony 
(Yarmey, 1982). 
Thus, elderly witnesses are perceived as less credible than young adults in general, but 
this stereotype will not inevitably affect how a particular elderly eyewitness is perceived 
at trial. An analogous phenomenon occurs with child witnesses, who despite being ste-
reotyped as less reliable than adults may come across in court as equally (and sometimes 
more) credible (Ross et al., 1990; Wells, Turtle, & Luus, 1989). Ross et al. (1990) explain 
this discrepancy between a witness’s perceived and actual credibility in terms of a “con-
trast effect,” whereby case-specifi c behavior that is inconsistent with a stereotype—e.g., 
an elderly witness who is confi dent and self-assured—can actually enhance the witness’s 
credibility. 
In addition to the infl uence of stereotypic expectations, a witness’s credibility can be 
affected by the aspect of credibility that is emphasized at trial. Leippe and Romanczyk 
(1987) distinguish between the “expertise” component of credibility—i.e., one’s ability to 
remember—and the “honesty” component. Children are perceived as low in expertise, but 
high in honesty (Leippe & Romanczyk, 1987). They are consequently seen as less cred-
ible than adults when the aspect of expertise is most salient, but more credible when the 
witness’s honesty is especially relevant (Goodman, Bottoms, Herscovici, & Shaver, 1989; 
Leippe & Romanczyk, 1987). 
Elderly eyewitnesses are perceived similarly, in that they are viewed as honest yet 
having faulty memories (Ross et al., 1990; Yarmey, 1984; Yarmey & Jones, 1983). 
In a trial where the witness’s honesty is the primary component of his or her credi-
bility, as in Ross et al.’s (1990) simulated drug trial, an elderly witness would have 
high credibility. On the other hand, if the witness’s ability to remember events and 
provide verbal descriptions is emphasized, the elderly eyewitness is likely to be less 
credible than a younger adult. Attorneys interested in raising the credibility of an el-
derly witness would do well to attend to these separate aspects of credibility and, 
where possible, stress the honesty component while minimizing the importance of 
memory expertise. Future research is needed that explicitly compares the credibility 
of elderly eyewitnesses in trials emphasizing these different aspects of witness cred-
ibility, but past research clearly suggests that elderly adults are not necessarily per-
ceived as lacking credibility. Ross et al. (1990) conclude that, concerning both chil-
dren and older adults, “witness age has no uniform influence on juror perceptions of 
credibility (p. 18). ” 
AGE EFFECTS ON EYEWITNESS ACCURACY
Research focusing on the accuracy of elderly eyewitnesses has addressed two separate 
components of eyewitness memory: the ability of eyewitnesses to describe  details of the 
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event, and their ability to recognize the crime’s perpetrator (Yarmey & Kent, 1980). The 
importance of the latter component is obvious; yet a variety of details may also be highly 
relevant at trial, such as the color of a traffi c light, what someone said, the number of gun-
shots fi red, the color of the perpetrator’s clothing, and so forth. 
Elderly witnesses’ memory for detail depends in large part on how their memory is 
tested. List (1986) found that compared to college students, older subjects (mean age = 
67. 6) who viewed videotaped shoplifting scenes remembered fewer details on a free re-
call measure, and what they did recall was less accurate. Older subjects are also less con-
fi dent in their recall performance (Yarmey, 1993). Elderly subjects are similarly disad-
vantaged when their memory for details is assessed with a recognition test employing a 
multiple-choice technique (e.g., “The assailant wore: (a) dark brown pants; (b) light blue 
pants; (c) blue jeans; (d) light brown pants”; taken from Yarmey & Kent, 1980). Their 
performance can be as good as younger subjects if a yes-no recognition test (e.g., “The 
assailant’s pants were dark brown-yes or no?”) is used (List, 1986), though they some-
times perform worse than young adults using this format as well (Loftus, Levidow, & 
Duensing, 1992). 
The effect of these different testing techniques refl ects the common observation 
that as people age, they do especially poorly on memory tasks that require self-initiat-
ed effort and the spontaneous use of retrieval strategies, such as free recall (e.g., Craik, 
1977). Elderly subjects may be able to use the types of retrieval strategies that recall 
tests require but lack the motivation to do so; their performance consequently suffers 
disproportionately (Perlmuter & Monty, 1989). On recognition tests, on the other hand, 
which are less demanding in this respect because they provide more retrieval cues, age 
differences are signifi cantly reduced (Craik, 1977; Craik & McDowd, 1987). The in-
clusion of distractors in a multiple-choice recognition test would tend to make it hard-
er than a yes-no recognition test, which could explain why Yarmey and Kent (1980) ob-
served an age-related impairment on recognition, while list (1986) did not. Thus, elder-
ly witnesses are not necessarily worse than younger adults at remembering details of a 
crime; this fi nding has practical implications for dealing with elderly witnesses, which 
are discussed below. 
Perhaps the most important task facing an eyewitness is the identifi cation of the perpe-
trator. As with memory for details, age has no uniform effect on identifi cation accuracy. 2 
O’Rourke, Penrod, Cutler, and Stuve (1989) found that age was negatively correlated with 
accuracy among subjects who saw a short videotape of a robbery; however, only twelve 
of 120 subjects were over age 60, so this result should be interpreted with a degree of cau-
tion. Yarmey and Kent (1980), on the other hand, included age as a grouping variable and 
found that older subjects (mean age = 73. 1) were just as accurate as young adults (mean 
age = 18. 6) at recognizing the assailant in a simulated assault. The only age difference 
in subjects’ identifi cation capacity was for identifying a bystander to the event, at which 
older subjects performed worse. Although it is clearly less important to be able to identi-
fy a bystander correctly than the perpetrator, older subjects’ inferior memory for bystand-
2 Eye witness identifi cation usually involves visual recognition of the criminal, but there are cases 
in which recognition is based on auditory cues. Although “earwitness” identifi cation is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it should be noted that there is some evidence that it worsens with age (Bull & 
Clifford, 1984). 
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ers can make them more likely to identify a bystander as the perpetrator (Yarmey, 1984), a 
potential error with very undesirable consequences. 
The subtle nature of age differences in identifi cation accuracy is also shown in re-
search on recognizing faces that is done outside the eyewitness paradigm. The basic face-
identifi cation paradigm is similar to that used in eyewitness lineups in that subjects are 
shown a face (or more often, a series of faces); then after some delay interval, they are 
presented those faces as well as previously unseen faces (or “foils”), and asked wheth-
er each face is old or new. This procedure differs from eyewitness research most notably 
in that the target face is presented by itself and not in the context of a complex event like 
a crime. Elderly subjects may be worse than or as good as young adults on such tasks, de-
pending on how accuracy is measured. The primary measures of accuracy are hits—cor-
rectly identifying old faces—and false alarms, or saying that a new face was seen previ-
ously (Shapiro & Penrod, 1986). Variables that strongly infl uence one measure do not nec-
essarily infl uence the other (Shapiro & Penrod, 1986), a lack of correlation which holds 
true for the variable of age. Older subjects make the same number of hits as young adults, 
but they make more false alarms (Bartlett & Leslie, 1986; Ferris, Crook, Clark, McCarthy, 
& Rae, 1980; Smith & Winograd, 1978). Furthermore, they are less confi dent than young 
adults when they do correctly reject foils (Yarmey, 1984; Yarmey & Kent, 1980). Old-
er subjects’ greater diffi culty at rejecting foils in an identifi cation task is consistent with 
their greater tendency to select false information when recognizing details of the event 
(Yarmey & Kent, 1980). 
This age difference in false alarms is eliminated, however, if subjects are shown mul-
tiple views of the original face (Bartlett & Leslie, 1986). Bartlett and Leslie (1986) point 
out that presenting subjects with multiple views is a more realistic experimental manipu-
lation: when a person experiences a face in one’s natural environment (whether or not it is 
in the context of witnessing a crime), one typically views it from more than one angle and 
sees it adopt various expressions. In this more naturalistic situation, older subjects (mean 
age = 74. 2) were just as accurate as high school seniors at recognizing previously seen 
faces, in terms of both hits and false alarms. 3 Although it is necessary, before drawing any 
defi nitive conclusions, to conduct a similar experiment with subjects who witness a com-
plex event like a crime, these results clearly suggest that identifi cation accuracy does not 
inevitably deteriorate with age. 
In summary, elderly eyewitnesses’ memory performance depends heavily on how 
their memory is assessed. In remembering details of a crime, they tend to recall less 
than younger witnesses but demonstrate little, if any, defi ciency at recognizing details 
of the event. Older subjects’ ability to identify a suspect’s face also shows little impair-
ment. They are more likely than younger adults to identify a bystander or novel stimu-
lus as the culprit, but even this effect may be mitigated if they are provided with a rich, 
multiperspective view of the suspect’s face. Interestingly, mock jurors are sensitive to 
elderly witnesses’ greater ability to recognize suspects than to recall verbal details about 
a crime (Yarmey & Jones, 1983). 
3 O’Rourke. et al. (1989) found that a similar manipulation that included multiple perspectives dur-
ing an eyewitness lineup—e.g., by showing suspects’ gait and posture—did not improve identi-
fi cation. regardless of subjects’ age. This result suggests that the benefi t of multiple perspectives 
comes from inducing deeper processing during encoding, when the target stimulus is fi rst seen (as 
in Bartlett & Leslie, 1986), and not at retrieval. 
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THE EFFECT OF AGE ON FACTORS THAT IMPAIR 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY
Regardless of an eyewitness’s age, the accuracy of his or her memory can be affected by 
a variety of factors having to do with the witness, the suspect, or the event itself (Def-
fenbacher, 1991). For example, memory is impaired when the witness has relatively lit-
tle opportunity to observe the perpetrator (Deffenbacher, 1991), when the witness’s race 
is different from the suspect’s (Bothwell, Brigham, & Malpass, 1989; Shapiro & Penrod, 
1986), or when the witness is given misleading information after the event has occurred 
(Loftus, 1979; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). 4
It seems fairly obvious that a witness’s ability to identify the suspect will be affect-
ed by his or her length of exposure to the suspect, particularly to the suspect’s face; and 
indeed, time spent looking at the perpetrator correlates positively with witness accuracy 
(Deffenbacher, 1991). Processing of visual and auditory information are abilities that de-
teriorate with age (e.g., Stine, Wingfi eld, & Poon, 1989). Thus, older adults are likely to 
be at a particular disadvantage in witnessing crimes, which are often chaotic and contain a 
large number of competing visual and auditory stimuli. 
Any aspect of the event that interferes with the witness’s ability to observe the perpe-
trator will have a negative effect on the witness’s subsequent memory. For example, the 
salient presence of a weapon tends to draw the witness’s attention to the weapon, conse-
quently impairing recognition of the criminal’s face (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987). The 
“weapon focus” phenomenon impairs identifi cation accuracy regardless of the witness’s 
age (O’Rourke et al., 1989). Importantly, however, its deleterious effect does not become 
greater as the witness’s age increases (O’Rourke et al., 1989). 
As discussed above, older adults perform worse than college-age subjects when a high 
demand is placed on attention to detail, while they are less disadvantaged at overall face 
recognition (Bartlett & Leslie, 1986; Yarmey & Kent, 1980). One explanation for people’s 
greater ability to recognize members of their own race than other races is that they attend 
less to detailed features in processing other-race faces (Bothwell et al., 1989; Shapiro & 
Penrod, 1986). Thus, one might expect older subjects to show a stronger own-race bias 
than younger subjects. Brigham and Williamson (1979) found that, like college-age sub-
jects, elderly subjects were better at recognizing own-race than other-race faces; howev-
er, they did not include age as a variable in their experiment, so it is unknown whether this 
tendency is more pronounced in elderly witnesses. 
Loftus and her colleagues have demonstrated that subjects’ reported memory for an 
event is infl uenced by information concerning the event that is suggested to them after the 
event has taken place. (e.g., Loftus, 1979; 1992; Loftus et al., 1978). For example, sub-
4 This is only a small subset of the variables that have been shown to affect eyewitness memory (for 
broader reviews, see Deffenbacher, 1991; Loftus, 1979; Ross, Read, & Toglia, 1994; Wells & Lof-
tus, 1984). I have selected these specifi c factors for further discussion because of the possibility that 
their effect is moderated by the variable of witness age. 
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jects who witnessed a car stopping at a yield sign, and who were subsequently asked, “Did 
another car pass the red Datsun while it was stopped at the stop sign? (emphasis added) “ 
were less likely to identify the yield sign (correctly) as what they originally saw than sub-
jects who were not misled (Loftus et al., 1978). Research has shown that children may be 
particularly susceptible to such suggestions (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Doris, 1991). There are 
reasons to suspect that older adults would be highly suggestible as well. 
Lindsay (1990; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989) has reconceptualized the misinformation 
effect in terms of “source monitoring. ” Source monitoring refers to judgments about 
the origin, or source, of information, as opposed to remembering the information itself 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). For example, one might recall that O. J. Simp-
son was charged with his ex-wife’s murder without being able to remember where one 
originally acquired that information; was it heard on the radio, watched on television, 
read in the newspaper, or communicated by a friend? According to Lindsay (1990), the 
misinformation effect refl ects a failure of source monitoring. Specifi cally, an eyewit-
ness acquires information about an event from two sources: by observing the event it-
self, and from subsequent suggestion. When the witness then falsely remembers a piece 
of information as part of the event, rather than as a suggestion, he or she has committed 
a source monitoring error, which impairs the ability to remember the original event de-
tails correctly. 
The source monitoring approach is particularly relevant to studying memory in 
elderly eyewitnesses because of the effect of aging on this specific type of mem-
ory task. Compared to young adults, elderly subjects have difficulty remembering 
the source of information (e.g., Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989; Schacter, 
Kaszniak, Kihlstrom, & Valdiserri, 1991); however, their memory for the informa-
tion itself is unimpaired (McIntyre & Craik, 1987). Cohen and Faulkner (1989, Ex-
periment 2) applied these findings to an eyewitness situation, by showing subjects a 
film of a kidnapping, and then presenting them with a narrative containing mislead-
ing details. When tested on their memory of the film, elderly subjects (mean age = 
70) were significantly more likely than younger subjects (mean age = 35) to have 
been misled by suggestive information that was in the narrative. Loftus et al. (1992) 
also found a tendency for elderly subjects (over age 65) to be more suggestible than 
younger adults when remembering details of a videotaped crime. Thus, older adults 
are more susceptible than young adults to misleading suggestions, and this disparity 
appears to be due, at least in part, to an impaired ability to discriminate between dif-
ferent sources of information. 
There is not a great deal of evidence regarding the interaction between age and fac-
tors that infl uence eyewitness memory, but what evidence there is suggests that age may 
exacerbate the negative infl uence of some variables. Consistent with research showing 
that aging is associated with source monitoring defi cits, the effect of misleading sug-
gestions becomes greater in elderly subjects. Although this is true when the misinfor-
mation concerns details of the witnessed event (Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Loftus et al., 
1992), it is not clear whether it would hold for misinformation concerning face recogni-
tion, where elderly subjects show little, if  any, impairment (Yarmey & Kent, 1980). Re-
search is needed that tests whether a misleading face presented after the event, or even 
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a misleading description of a perpetrator’s face, would have differential effects on rec-
ognizing the perpetrator depending on subjects’ age. Oilier factors, such as the witness’s 
opportunity to observe me crime, weapon focus, and cross-racial identifi cation, affect 
the elderly in the same manner as younger subjects. A greater effect of these variables in 
elderly witnesses has not been demonstrated; however, inasmuch as the average elder-
ly eyewitness could be expected to make poorer observations, owing simply to inferior 
sensory capabilities, these factors might also become more problematic as a witness’s 
age increases. 
MEANS OF IMPROVING ELDERLY EYEWITNESSES’ 
MEMORY
Based on these fi ndings, a number of recommendations can be made for improving 
me accuracy of elderly eyewitnesses. An abundance of research shows that older sub-
jects perform more like young adults when fewer demands are placed on their retrieval 
processes, indicating mat they often know more than they can say (e.g., Craik, 1977). 
When asking an elderly witness to remember details of a crime, attempts should be 
made to ask precise questions and emphasize recognition memory, as opposed to re-
call. Of course, those questioning elderly witnesses would have to make a careful ef-
fort not to present recognition questions in a leading manner. A reasonable and effec-
tive compromise would be to begin with unstructured, free recall (“Tell me everything 
you can remember”), then move to specifi c questions (“What color was the perpetra-
tor’s shirt?”), and fi nish with a series of yes-no recognition questions (“Was his shirt 
blue? red?” etc.). 
When elderly witnesses are asked to identify a criminal suspect, there is a larger 
risk than with younger witnesses that they will pick an innocent person from the lineup 
(Bartlett, 1993; Ferris et al., 1980; Smith & Winograd, 1978). The false alarm problem 
could be addressed in two different ways: by changing the lineup procedure, or by facil-
itating the retrieval process. With elderly witnesses, police should emphasize even more 
than usual the degree of certainty that is required to identify a suspect from a lineup; this 
procedure is analogous to raising one’s criterion in a signal-detection task, which reduces 
me number of false alarms (cf. Shapiro & Penrod, 1986). In addition, me lineup could be 
presented one member at a time, rather than simultaneously. Young adult witnesses who 
were asked to make sequential yes-no judgments for each member of a lineup made fewer 
false alarms than when the standard procedure was used, in which they attempted to iden-
tify the suspect among several individuals presented simultaneously (Lindsay & Wells, 
1985). This variation is analogous to using a yes/no recognition test instead of a multiple-
choice test with several distractors, which appears to minimize age differences in memory 
for details (compare List, 1986, to Yarmey & Kent, 1980). As elderly eyewitnesses are es-
pecially prone to making false identifi cations, sequential presentation with these witness-
es should prove particularly helpful. 
Bartlett (1993) argues that elderly subjects’ greater tendency to make false alarms re-
sults from a defi cit in recollecting the context in which a face initially appeared. Thus, a 
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second approach to alleviating the problem would be to reinstate the context during re-
trieval by instructing the elderly witness to imagine the scene of the crime. This technique 
is part of the “guided cognitive interview” procedure developed by Geiselman, Fisher, 
MacKinnon, and Holland (1985), which also has witnesses adopt different temporal or-
ders and perceptual perspectives in remembering a crime. These mnemonic techniques in-
crease the amount of detail information that young adult witnesses are able to remember 
(Fisher, Geiselman, & Amador, 1989; Geiselman et al., 1985). Because they provide ad-
ditional retrieval cues—something older adults are less profi cient at doing on their own 
(Craik, 1977)—these techniques ought to improve elderly witnesses’ memory for details 
as well. Consistent with Bartlett’s (1993) approach, the guided interview has been shown 
to improve the identifi cation accuracy of elderly, as well as young adult,. eyewitnesses 
(O’Rourke et al., 1989). 
Using a somewhat related procedure, Bekerian and Bowers (1983) have demonstrated 
that eyewitness memory is improved by asking the witness questions about the event that 
adhere to a chronological sequence, rather than jumping around in time. In particular, this 
questioning technique reduces the effect of misinformation that is presented after the wit-
nessed event. Alternatively, the misinformation effect can be reduced by testing eyewit-
ness memory with a source monitoring procedure, rather than a standard recognition test. 
Lindsay and Johnson (1989) have demonstrated that misled subjects who were instruct-
ed to discriminate between sources (i.e., “Did this information come from the witnessed 
event or the post-event narrative?”) made fewer errors than subjects who took a yes/no 
recognition test (i.e., “Was this information in the witnessed event?”). 
Neither Bekerian and Bowers’ (1983) nor Lindsay and Johnson’s (1989) technique has 
been used with elderly eyewitnesses; but in light of older individuals’ heightened suscep-
tibility to misleading suggestions (Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Loftus et al., 1992) and gen-
eral source monitoring defi cits Johnson et al., 1993), these methods should be at least as 
effective as with younger subjects. Other means of reducing the effect of misleading in-
formation that have been demonstrated in young adult subjects, and might work equally 
well with elderly witnesses, include warning the witness about the possibility of encoun-
tering misinformation (Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982) and having the witness make a 
public statement prior to learning any subsequent information (Loftus, 1979). 
SUMMARY: WHAT WE KNOW, WHAT WE DON’T KNOW, 
AND WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW
In the 10 years since Yarmey (1984) noted the paucity of research on eyewitness memo-
ry in the elderly, a number of fi ndings have been added to the literature, though the topic 
is still vastly underresearched relative to children’s testimony. Despite people’s generally 
low expectations regarding- the quality of testimony offered by elderly witnesses (Ross et 
al., 1990, Experiment 3; Yarmey & Jones, 1983), their testimony does not necessarily lack 
credibility (Ross et al., 1990, Experiments 1 and 2). It is likely that elderly witnesses are 
perceived favorably in trial situations that place a high premium on honesty, but unfavor-
ably when their ability to remember is emphasized. 
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With regard to elderly witnesses’ memorial capacities, there is little evidence to sug-
gest that eyewitness abilities deteriorate substantially with age. Older eyewitnesses are 
able to remember details of an event as well as younger witnesses if they are asked to rec-
ognize rather than freely recall them (List, 1986). They do show a tendency to make more 
false identifi cations in face recognition (Bartlett, 1993; Smith & Winograd, 1978), but 
this tendency may be a consequence of using impoverished and unrealistic target stimuli 
(Bartlett & Leslie, 1986). Furthermore, it can be offset by providing more contextual cues 
at retrieval (Bartlett, 1993; O’Rourke et al., 1989). 
Variables that negatively affect young adults’ eyewitness memory, such as weapon fo-
cus and cross-race identifi cation, affect older subjects as well, but not to a demonstrably 
greater extent (Brigham & Williamson, 1979; O’Rourke et al., 1989). It is possible that 
other factors infl uencing eyewitness reliability, such as arousal, physical distinctiveness of 
the suspect, or witness gender (Deffenbacher, 1991; Wells & Loftus, 1984) would have a 
disproportionate effect on elderly witnesses, but systematic research on the relationship of 
age to those factors remains to be done (though see Loftus et al., 1992, and Yarmey, 1993, 
on gender differences as a function of age). 
The only factor which has been reliably shown to affect elderly eyewitnesses more 
than young adults is post-event misinformation (Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Loftus, et al., 
1992). This fi nding refl ects older adults’ general diffi culty in performing source moni-
toring tasks (e.g., Hashtroudi et al., 1989). Research is needed to test the hypothesis that 
techniques that can be used successfully to minimize the misinformation effect in young 
adults (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989) would likewise be ef-
fective with elderly subjects. 
In summary, elderly eyewitnesses are disadvantaged less in what they can remember 
than in how they respond to certain types of testing procedures. Previous research sug-
gests that their retrieval of information could be enhanced by emphasizing recognition 
rather than recall of both faces and event details, and by otherwise providing contextu-
al retrieval cues. Future research is called for on additional techniques that can be used to 
optimize the recollections of elderly witnesses and to minimize pitfalls to which they are 
particularly susceptible, such as false positive identifi cations and the effect of misinfor-
mation. As such techniques are developed, elderly eyewitnesses should be able to demon-
strate a high level of reliability and to make signifi cant contributions to criminal investi-
gations and trials. 
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